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Local government is a mirror of the larger political and economic forces, cleavages and 
problems that are shaping South African society. It is these deeper fault lines in society, 
rather than the Zuma government’s turnaround strategy or the 2011 local elections result, 
which will drive future policy and determine its effects. This is the first lesson of local 
government reform in all four terms of national government examined in this chapter. 
In each term, national policy reforms were moulded by shifting political and economic 
circumstances and larger national interests, not simply by the unfolding logic of the original 
blueprint for local government in the 1998 white paper. The outcome of eighteen years 
of policy reform, however, was not the new society imagined in the white paper, but an 
imperfect transition that is local government today: where peaceful electoral competition 
coexists with violent public protests, racial group areas endure in fact, even if not in law, 
pockets of good governance survive amidst systemic corruption and mismanagement, and 
national policy goals consistently exceed local government’s capacity to deliver them and 
the economy’s skills base. The second lesson flows from that reality – due to the fact that the 
problems of local government are so nested in the broader problems of our society, further 
local government policy reform and sweeping national turnaround strategies are likely to 
have imperfect impacts on ‘the problem of local government’ in South Africa.
INTRODUCTION
The Mandela government’s white paper on local government offered a new vision of 
post-apartheid society, embodied in the concept of developmental local government 
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(Ministry of Constitutional Development and Provincial Affairs, 1998). The territory of 
the country would be divided into municipalities, each governed by an elected municipal 
council. Municipalities would integrate racially divided group areas under a single local 
authority and a common tax base. Local development plans would guide programmes of 
national reconstruction and development. Citizens would partner with municipalities to 
build non-racial communities. Municipalities would redistribute expenditure to service 
delivery in poor black communities. By the time that implementation began in 2000 the 
force of this transformative vision was already spent – overtaken by hard political and 
economic realities, overwhelmed by the scale of institutional changes involved and the 
distance between the ideal and delivering practical change. This chapter examines the 
major local government policy reforms1 in the four terms of national government since 
1994, analysing key factors that have informed policy and shaped its effects, concluding 
with a perspective from an early 2012 vantage point on the prospects for policy reform 
following the 2011 local elections. 
The chapter’s central argument is that in the four terms of national government, 
local government reforms were not unfolding episodes in a continuous, uninterrupted 
process of implementing the white paper’s vision for developmental local government. 
Policy and local institutions were shaped less by original design than by changing 
political and economic realities in the country, competing national policy objectives, 
often by strategic miscalculations, and more lately by competition for power in 
the ANC.
The outcome of eighteen years of local government reform was not the 
new society imagined in the white paper, but an imperfect transition that is local 
government today:  Formal electoral competition coexists with increasingly violent 
public protests between elections. Pockets of performance endure amidst systemic 
corruption and mismanagement. And the expectations of policy-makers continually 
exceed local delivery capacity and the skills base of the economy. Local government 
is a reflection of South African society, and it is the deeper fault lines in our society 
which have consistently shaped the design and impact of policy. The ANC will interpret 
the result of the 2011 election as popular support for its turnaround strategy for 
local government, but the factors impacting on local government effectiveness are 
substantially beyond the control of policy-makers and unable to be reversed through 
sweeping policy solutions. 
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The chapter now assesses the serial efforts of South Africa’s successive democratic 
governments to close the persistent gap between the ideals of local government 
transformation and realised turnaround on the ground.
DEVELOPMENTAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT  –  THE MANDELA 
GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY (1994-99)
The process to formulate the white paper intersected with three major developments in 
the country, each of which left an imprint on local government policy and institutions. 
First, the Constitutional Assembly was writing the country’s new constitution. In 1996 
local government graduated from a statutory institution to a full sphere of government 
with a broad developmental mandate. Second, following the first democratic elections 
in 1994, the ANC-led government of national unity (GNU) took office with a strong 
mandate from the electorate to rebuild and develop the country. Local government was 
to play a lead role in reducing poverty, providing services to meet basic needs. Third, to 
grow the economy, government adopted a macro-economic framework in 1996 which 
introduced fiscal austerity measures. Thereafter, local government reforms would be 
disciplined by fiscal reform goals, budget contraction and tighter treasury controls. 
The white paper’s vision for local government was thus conceived in a context defined 
by competing policy objectives. This section examines the impact this has had on the 
original policy vision of local government.       
Origin of developmental local government in the constitutional negotiations
The genealogy of developmental local government can be traced back to the civic 
struggles against apartheid of the 1980s. A powerful civic movement had emerged 
in response to the appalling conditions in black townships and the government’s 
attempts to establish black local authorities in townships without conceding full 
citizenship rights to blacks. The civic struggles linked local grievances to the cause of 
national liberation. After 1990, civics and local authorities in towns and cities across 
the country began to negotiate local settlements to rent and service boycotts and 
the amalgamation of racial local authorities.2 These initiatives established the place 
of local actors at the national negotiating table, the role of local government under 
the democratic order, and the founding concepts of developmental local government 
(such as ‘one city one tax base’ and phased-in transition). When the final national 
negotiations process got underway in 1993, local actors negotiated a new democratic 
dispensation for local government in the Local Government Negotiating Forum 
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(LGNF).3 One of the outcomes of the LGNF was the Local Government Transition Act 
of 1993 (LGTA) which outlined the pathway for the transition to full local democracy.4 
The LGTA set out three phases for local government transition. The first, 
pre-interim phase (1993-1995) started with the negotiated settlement in 1993 and 
concluded with the election of transitional local councils in 1995/96. Local governments 
of unity were established and consensus seeking was promoted through measures such 
as a two-thirds majority vote to adopt the budget and proportional representation on 
the executive committee (Steytler & De Visser, 2009:paras 1-13). The Act provided 
for provincial commissions to demarcate the boundaries of the transitional urban, 
rural and metropolitan municipalities, which led to the creation of 842 municipalities 
governed by transitional councils elected in 1995/6. The elections inaugurated the 
second, interim phase (1995-2000), which coincided with the term of the Mandela 
government and the adoption of the new constitution in 1996 and concluded with 
the first fully democratic local elections in 2000, which would launch the third and 
final phase.  
The reconstruction and development programme (RDP)
The RDP was the ANC’s vision for social justice after apartheid and the guiding 
framework for government policy in the first term (ANC, 1994). The RDP gave local 
government an expansive mandate to meet basic needs and promote people-centred 
government and outlined the key principles of democratic local government – such as 
a single tax base, participatory government, cross-subsidisation of service delivery, 
and writing off of the debts accrued by black local authorities. The white paper would 
consolidate the RDP principles into a vision for developmental local government.     
Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
GEAR was adopted in 1996 to boost economic growth to 6 percent, the minimum 
rate needed to create jobs, extend service delivery and overcome inequality. GEAR 
introduced short-term austerity, including deficit reduction, budget reprioritisation, 
and stronger state coordination of fiscal and budget policy (Ministry of Finance, 1996). 
GEAR was the guiding framework for a comprehensive process to reform the budget 
process, the intergovernmental fiscal system, financial management and accounting 
practices which rolled out over the next five years. Various streams of capital payments 
to municipalities were consolidated into the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure 
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Programme in 1996. The local government equitable share formula was introduced in 
1998 to subsidise a package of basic municipal services to indigent households. These 
major reforms to local government finances were introduced contemporaneously with 
the drafting of the white paper.            
The white paper and legislation
The white paper defined developmental local government as (Ministry of Constitutional 
Development and Provincial Affairs, 1998:17): 
... local government committed to working with citizens and groups within the community to 
find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality 
of their lives. 
In 1998 the Municipal Demarcation Act (Act No. 27 of 1998) and the Municipal 
Structures Act (Act No. 117 of 1998) were promulgated to give territorial and 
structural effect to the policy. The former Act created a demarcation board to determine 
the boundaries of the new municipalities, 284 municipalities were eventually 
established. The latter provided for the structural, political and functional institutions 
for metropolitan, district and local municipalities, with the latter two tiers sharing 
jurisdiction over rural areas. 
From the start, local government policy and institutions were imprinted by 
competing national objectives. First, the constitution and RDP gave local government 
a broad mandate to meet basic needs and redistribute capital spending to poor 
communities, the central ideas behind municipal integrated development planning 
and district-led redistribution. Second, intergovernmental fiscal policy, however, 
would now consistently discipline local government policy in line with macro-economic 
goals. In practice this meant a contraction of expenditure on service delivery and 
stronger central control over all policy-making, progressively shifting the real levers of 
policy control from the Department of Constitutional Developmental to the National 
Treasury. Third, by the time the white paper was adopted it was already accepted that 
redistribution would be a national, not a local, responsibility, and the abolition of the 
regional services council levy was on the cards (abolished in 2003). In effect, these 
policies knocked off one of the main rationales for district government and its only 
source of redistributable income.  Fourth, the design of the local government equitable 
share was predicated on the assumption that local government raised 90 percent of its 
own revenue and only 10 percent would be subsidised through the intergovernmental 
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grant system (Department of Finance, 1998:23). This resulted in the underfunding of 
municipal service delivery, an issue that emerged sharply at the ANC’s debriefing after 
the 2011 elections. Fifth, the repeal in 1996 of the Profession of Towns Clerks Act, 
which had regulated the appointment of qualified professionals as municipal managers, 
effectively left the qualifications and competences of municipal managers unregulated 
until the National Treasury introduced regulations in 2007.5 The net effect of these 
developments was that at the same time that municipal boundaries were expanding 
to include under-serviced rural populations and townships and national policy was 
giving local government a vast developmental mandate, the new sphere was being 
asked ‘to do more with less resources’ and a crumbling skills base.6     
ESTABLISHING DEVELOPMENTAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT  –  THE 
FIRST MBEKI GOVERNMENT (1999-2004)
The first elections under the new system took place in 2000 at the start of the first 
Mbeki government, the final phase of the local government transition. The Department 
of Provincial and Local Government replaced the Department of Constitutional 
Development. Two main priorities occupied the term. The first was establishing the 
new municipalities and inducting the new councils. Government planners divided the 
final phase into three periods: Two years were set aside for establishment (2000-02), 
followed by a two-year period of consolidating the new systems (2002-05) and the 
sustainability phase (2005 onwards), by which time the new systems were expected 
to be fully operational. By 2001 it was clear that the transition timeline was seriously 
flawed. Against all of the main indicators, the establishment process was slow. The 
institutional framework for local government was also incomplete (Department of 
Provincial and Local Government, 2001).7 
The second priority was completing the policy, legislative, and regulatory 
frame works for municipal planning, service delivery, finances and administration. 
In 2001 government adopted a policy of providing a package of free basic services 
(FBS) in water, electricity, sanitation and refuse services to all citizens, targeting poor 
households. National subsidies to local government for basic services would increase 
over the next 10 years. However, at the time FBS was introduced, there was no final 
division of the functional responsibility for these services between districts and locals 
(only finalised in 2003), and major restructuring was involved in transferring water 
schemes and staff from the water sector to local government.  
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The legislative framework was completed with the passage of the Municipal 
Systems Act (Act No. 32 of 2000), regulating planning, service delivery, performance 
monitoring and public participation; the Municipal Finance Management Act (Act No. 
56 of 2003), regulating financial management, accounting, supply-chain management, 
reporting and budgeting; the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework 
Act (Act No. 41 of 2003), providing for relations between traditional leadership and 
municipalities; and the Municipal Property Rates Act (Act No. 6 of 2004), regulating 
property evaluations and taxing. The intergovernmental grant system was also 
undergoing major reform, leading to the phased-in introduction of the Municipal 
Infrastructure Grant in 2003. Perhaps the most important of these reforms was 
the finance management legislation, which introduced international standards for 
financial management in all municipalities, and progressively consolidated National 
Treasury control over local government policy.
The contradictions in local government policy had deepened under the first 
Mbeki government. National policy had created heightened expectations about local 
government’s contribution to poverty relief, setting firm targets for universal access 
to basic services. But municipalities were still struggling with basic problems of 
establishment, and the policy, legislative and fiscal frameworks regulating municipal 
systems were yet to be completed. 
INCLUSIVE GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION  –  THE SECOND 
MBEKI GOVERNMENT (2004-09)
The central objective of the second Mbeki government was economic growth of 6 
percent and a fairer distribution of its benefits (Presidency, 2004:33-34). A dangerous 
gap had opened between what Mbeki began to call the first and second economies 
– the elite on top, the poor masses without economic hope at the bottom, and no 
‘connecting staircase’ between the two economies (Pressley, 9 October 2003). Local 
government was conceptualised as an important bridge. Improved capital expenditure 
in the urban built environment (transport, energy, FIFA World Cup stadia) would 
crowd in private sector investment, boosting growth in the first economy and hence 
job creation. Municipal expenditure on basic needs, as part of a wider social safety 
net for the poor, would help to combat poverty in the second economy. But local 
government lacked the engineering, planning, financial and project management 
skills that were essential to fulfil these tasks. The economy was not producing these 
scarce skills (Presidency, 2008). Special short-term national measures were needed to 
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boost the municipal skills base. Government had miscalculated the disastrous impacts 
of transformation on municipal skills. 
Local government reform had three main objectives during the term: deploying 
expertise to skills-depleted municipalities (known as Project Consolidate), stronger 
coordination of public spending on growth and fighting poverty, through more 
centralised intergovernmental relations (the Intergovernmental Relations Framework 
Act No. 13 of 2005) and a new strategic framework for local government (the Five Year 
Strategic Agenda, including long-term policy review). 
Project Consolidate 
Project Consolidate was a two-year national intervention (2004-06) to support 
municipalities lacking the expertise to discharge their mandate to provide basic 
services. It also sought to address the fact that national and provincial departments 
were not fulfilling their constitutional duty to support municipalities. Project 
Consolidate deployed technical experts to 136 municipalities – generally in rural 
areas or former homelands which had the highest backlogs in basic services and were 
economically depressed (Department of Provincial and Local Government, 2006a:1). 
The Development Bank of South Africa introduced a similar programme, called 
Siyenza Manje, to support financial management and infrastructure planning. By 
April 2008, Project Consolidate and Siyenza Manje deployments totalled 1,124 in 268 
municipalities (Department of Provincial and Local Government, 2009:215). It was 
difficult to measure the impact of these capacity-building measures. And by putting a 
number to the municipalities under stress government had in effect announced that 
there was a systemic crisis in local government. Since then policy reform has been 
on a crisis footing. In practice, these interventions did little to improve the financial 
performance of municipalities, which is perhaps the most important indicator of the 
health of local government. In his audit report for 2009/2010, the Auditor-General 
found that despite the ‘abundance of technical tools to support municipalities’ the 
results were only ‘fractionally better than the previous year’ (Auditor-General, 2011a; 
for the full report see Auditor-General, 2011b).                                      
The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (Act No. 13 of 2005) 
The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (IGRFA) was introduced in 2005 
to establish greater predictability in intergovernmental relations and to promote 
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alignment of national, provincial and local plans and expenditures. The Act addressed 
three local government concerns. First, to overcome the haphazard way in which 
departments had been consulting with local government, statutory membership in all 
key intergovernmental forums was conferred on organised local government. Second, 
the Act provided for direct representation of district executive mayors in provincial 
intergovernmental forums, to promote effective executive-to-executive engagements 
between these two spheres. Third, district intergovernmental forums were established 
to force cooperation between district and local executives, to overcome the tension 
and competition that typified relations between the two tiers. The impact of the 
IGFRA is hard to measure, but the institutions are established and operational, and 
since 2005 relations between the ANC national government and the DA controlled 
governments in the Western Cape and Cape Town have been transacted through the 
Act’s machinery.      
The five-year strategic agenda for local government 2006-11 
In January 2006, Cabinet adopted the Five-Year Strategic Agenda (5YSA) for the second 
term of local government (2006-11), following a comprehensive review of the first 
term of local government (2000-05) (Department of Provincial and Local Government, 
2006b). The review found that the final phase of the transition had been too ambitious 
and pointed to the worrying mismatch between national policy objectives and local 
government’s capacity to implement them. Poor policy coordination, overregulation 
of local government, and unsystematic support for municipalities were identified 
as contributing to municipal distress. The review outlined three imperatives for 
the next five years (Department of Provincial and Local Government, 2006b). First 
municipalities would have to improve their performance and their accountability to 
communities. Second, an unprecedented national capacity-building effort would be 
required to help local government to discharge its mandate. Third, more effective 
coordination of policy, and monitoring and supervision of local government were 
required. Over time, the objectives of the 5YSA were systematically anchored in the 
plans and operations of municipalities, provinces and national sector departments as 
the guiding strategic framework. The 5YSA would be replaced in 2009 by the Zuma 
government’s turnaround strategy.  
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The policy review of provincial and local government 2007-09
In January 2007, Cabinet approved a process to develop a white paper on provincial 
government and review the white paper on local government (known as the policy 
review of provincial and local government). Longer-term policy review was part of 
the 5YSA. Later that year the ANC released a discussion document on the future of 
provinces setting out three options: retaining, abolishing, or reforming the provincial 
system (ANC, 2007). The policy review began in August and the public was invited to 
make written submissions on 65 policy questions (Department of Provincial and Local 
Government, 2007b). There was widespread support for reviewing or abolishing the 
two-tier system. The policy review process in government was overtaken by events 
at Polokwane in December 2007 when Mbeki lost the ANC leadership race to Zuma 
and Mbeki’s subsequent resignation in 2008. The final report on the policy review, 
which has yet to be released to the public, was submitted to cabinet in January 2009. 
In the ANC, the process survived Polokwane. The ANC took a resolution to hold a 
special summit on provincial and local government, which took place in December 
2010. The outcome was inconclusive – the ANC resolved to appoint a Presidential 
Review Commission to continue the work (ANC, 2010), which by early 2012 had yet 
to be appointed. The discussion document on local government for the 2012 policy 
conference, published in March, was not only poorly drafted, but largely repeats both 
the Summit’s recommendation of an expert commission, the ANC’s options for reform 
tabled in 2007 and the findings of the Mbeki government’s policy review (ANC, 2012). 
It provides little clarity about policy direction on provincial and local government 
and adds nothing new. The National Planning Commission’s National Development 
Plan: Vision 2030, on the other hand, is a pragmatic and well-researched document. 
It does not support major structural reform to provinces, but rather a ‘more focused 
role for provinces’ to make the current system work more effectively (NPC, 2011:386). 
It is unlikely that national government will take any major decision on the future of 
the provincial system before the ANC policy conference in mid-2012 and the elective 
conference in December 2012.        
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CRISIS  –  THE ZUMA PRESIDENCY 
(2009-PRESENT)
The Zuma government ‘took office with the economy in recession, under enormous 
pressure to combat growing job losses, but with his party wounded and divided 
following Mbeki’s resignation’ (Steytler & Powell, 2010:151). The Zuma government’s 
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approach to local government reflected the sense of crisis in the country. A national 
turnaround of local government would be the centrepiece of the new administration’s 
local government policy for the next five years, and the platform from which the ANC 
would contest the 2011 municipal elections.         
The national turnaround strategy for local government
In May 2009, the Ministry of Provincial and Local Government was disbanded and 
replaced by the Ministry of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA). 
In his budget speech for the 2009/10 financial year, the new Minister repeatedly 
attacked the former Minister (Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional 
Affairs, 2009). The new ministry would be the ‘choir conductor’ coordinating the system 
of cooperative governance. The practical effect of the change in leadership was that all 
existing programmes were put on hold pending a major restructuring of the department, 
and flagship policies such as the Five-Year Strategic Agenda were discontinued.  
The Local Government Turnaround Strategy (TAS) emerged from COGTA’s 
assessment of the state of local government in 2009 (COGTA, 2009a; COGTA, 2009c). 
The report found that while local government had contributed to democratisation, 
the system as a whole was ‘showing signs of distress’ (COGTA, 2009a:2). Indicators 
of this distress included ‘huge service delivery backlogs’, a breakdown in council 
communication with and accountability to citizens, political interference in 
administration, corruption, fraud, bad management, increasing violent service 
delivery protests, factionalism in parties, and depleted municipal capacity (COGTA, 
2009a:13). These were symptoms of deeper systemic problems in local government 
and cooperative governance (COGTA, 2009a:9-10). In some cases ‘accountable 
government and the rule of law had collapsed or were collapsing’ due to corruption, 
profiteering, and mismanagement. The report was the most forthright admission yet 
by government that local government was in a state of crisis. Following this report, 
the government adopted the Turnaround Strategy for Local Government (TAS) as an 
outcome in its five-year programme of action (Presidency, 2010). All municipalities 
were expected to adopt turnaround strategies as part of their IDPs. Three key priorities 
for TAS were improving access to basic services; deepening participatory democracy; 
and improving financial management and administrative capacity.
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Improving access to basic services
Government’s goal is to achieve ‘universal access to basic services for all households 
by 2014’ (COGTA, 2009b). There has been significant progress: 93 percent of the 
population has access to a basic level of water – a stand pipe within 200 metres from 
a dwelling (COGTA, 2011a); 73 percent of households have access to electricity; 67 
percent have access to basic sanitation (a ventilated pit latrine in the dwelling); and 59 
percent to once a week refuse removal (COGTA, 2009b:9). But there are major obstacles 
to achieving the target. There are huge inter-provincial disparities, with provinces that 
absorbed former homelands and rural areas well below the national average for most 
services. The population statistics on which funding for these services is calculated 
are also outdated (2001 census), with the result that services are often underfunded. 
In 2007, for example, it was estimated that an additional R63 billion was needed 
to meet the service targets. Exponential connection rates for water and electricity 
services must be achieved each year to meet the targets. For example, in 2007 it was 
estimated that 500,000 new electricity connections per annum were needed, but 
there was only funding available for half that amount (Department of Provincial and 
Local Government, 2007a). The backlogs in bulk infrastructure are huge; outstanding 
municipal debt had grown to R62.3 billion as at 31 December 2010, and dependency 
on grants has increased even in the metros (National Treasury, 2011:62). 
Deepening public participation
Legislation provides many avenues for public involvement in municipal planning, 
budgeting, service delivery, and performance evaluation. A variety of structures serve 
this goal (IDP Forums, ward committees, and service delivery improvement forums). 
Despite the existence of this formal machinery for participation, public protests have 
increased in number and frequency since 1994. For example, between 2007 and 2010 
the average number of protests per month was 8.73 in 2007, 9.83 in 2008, 19.18 in 
2009, and 16.33 in 2010 (Jain & Powell, 2010:14).8 Since 2010 (Karamoko, 2011:1), 
... the country has witnessed unprecedented rates of violent protests. These findings suggest that 
there remains strong public discontent with municipal service delivery throughout South Africa 
despite the appearance of relative calm. 
Protests are also increasingly prone to violence (injury to persons or property 
caused by protesters or the use of force by the state during protests): 42 percent of 
protests in 2007, 38 percent in 2008, 44 percent in 2009 and 54 percent in the first 
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six months of 2010 involved violence of some kind (Jain & Powell 2010:14). Deputy 
Minister of COGTA, Yunus Carrim, sounded an alarm in 2010 when he warned that 
‘the rage of sections of the protestors and the extent of violence and destruction they 
wreak’ reflected ‘a far more fundamental alienation of people from our democracy. It 
suggests an acute sense of marginalisation and social exclusion’ (Deputy Minister of 
COGTA, 2010). It was the first time that a government leader had publically drawn 
a direct political connection between the rise in violent protests and the failure of 
developmental local government.
Another kind of protest – organised – directed at local government is the 
withholding of rates by some ratepayers. In towns across the country, ratepayers 
associations have declared disputes with municipalities over poor service delivery, 
corruption and mismanagement, withheld the payment of rates and taxes to their 
municipalities in response and, in some cases, assumed the responsibility to provide 
municipal services. Ratepayers associations in 70 towns have declared disputes, with 
R10 million withheld by ratepayers in 35 towns (Powell et al., 2010).9 
In response to these protests, government is considering ways to improve 
public participation by increasing the size of a ward committee (from 10-30 members) 
and reviewing the funding model for ward councillors (COGTA, 2011a). The response 
overlooks three factors. First, the increase in protest action is an indicator that 
protests have become a more efficient way for communities to express grievances and 
make demands than formal avenues. Second, there is a mismatch between the public’s 
low awareness of participatory structures (let alone actual participation) and the high 
expectations that policy-makers have for public participation. Third, government 
has no reliable measurement of the impact that public participation has on local 
governance beyond a simple head count of people attending meetings.
Improving financial management and administrative capacity
The MFMA set high standards for financial reporting and accounting that few 
municipalities meet in practice. The Auditor-general’s report for 2009/2010 showed the 
extent of the challenge, only 7 of the 237 municipalities received clean audits. Drawing 
on comparable findings from the Auditor-General’s report for 2007/08, COGTA’s state of 
local government report noted the worrying state of municipal financial management: 
54 percent of municipalities in 2007/08 received qualified, disclaimer or adverse audit 
opinions and in 45 percent of cases ‘unauthorised, fruitless and wasteful expenditure’ 
had led to the qualifications (COGTA, 2009:73-74). The TAS set 2014 as the target for 
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all municipalities to attain a clean audit. The Department’s Annual Performance Plan for 
2011/2012 breaks this commitment down into annual targets for the next three years. 
By 2011/12, 60 percent of municipalities are expected to attain unqualified audits, rising 
to 75 percent in 2012/13 and 100 percent in 2013/14 (COGTA, 2011b:42). In light of 
the reality presented in the annual reports of the Auditor-general and COGTA’s own 
report, these targets are unrealistic. COGTA faces a major political dilemma. It has set 
a firm national target for clean audits but has no control over the activities that shape 
audit outcomes, which are all under the full control of municipalities.
Improving the quality of municipal administration is a key priority and will 
require, firstly, that competent professionals are appointed to senior management 
positions and, secondly, that municipal administration is insulated from undue party 
political influence. In 2007, the National Treasury issued regulations to prescribe 
general and minimum competences and qualifications for the various classes of 
senior management. These regulations come into full effect in 2012. Parliament also 
passed the Municipal Systems Amendment Act (Act No. 7 of 2011) which, amongst 
others things, prohibits office bearers of political parties from occupying management 
positions. The President assented to the Act on 5 July 2011 despite stiff resistance 
from the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). These are important 
‘supply-side’ measures, but the larger problem remains the scarcity of skills in the 
economy and making local government attractive to mobile professionals.              
CONCLUSION – CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, POLICY REFORM 
AFTER LOCAL ELECTION 2011
The ANC government will view the result of local election 2011 as a popular validation 
for its turnaround strategy for local government, the platform from which it fought 
the 2011 municipal elections. Popular support for the turnaround strategy, however, 
is not enough for the strategy to succeed. The lesson in this brief overview of local 
government reform since 1994, is that policy-making is not simply a matter of getting 
the ‘ideas right’ so as to ‘straighten out our practices’.10 The factors that will determine 
whether the turnaround targets will be met are largely not under the control of national 
policy-makers. Clean audits cannot be decreed from Pretoria. Insisting on clean audits 
as the indicator of success also precludes government from claiming success against 
more manageable short-term targets (such as graduation from disclaimer to qualified 
audits). The question of insulating administration from party politics will also not 
be decided on the merits of the recent amendments to legislation. It will depend on 
whether the ANC’s will to force the issue can survive a sustained onslaught from 
 25 
Imperfect transition – local government policy reform in South Africa 1994-2012
www.sun-e-shop.co.za © 2012 SUN MeDIA MeTRO and authors. www.africansunmedia.co.za
Cosatu within ANC and Alliance structures. The ruling party’s increased hold over 
government policy also presents challenges for government policy-makers. First, the 
ANC lacks the technical capacity that is required to make credible policy in this complex 
sector. Second, it locks government policy-makers into internal party processes and 
work schedules, paralysing decision-making. Third, it makes major institutional 
reforms (such as abolishing districts) an unlikely prospect, because interests are too 
vested in the current system and coalitions too fragile to build a strong consensus on 
major reforms.  
In less than five years government’s policy stance on local government shifted 
180 degrees, from a forward looking agenda to crisis and turnaround. By couching 
local government reform in the language of a systemic crisis requiring national 
intervention, the Zuma government has sacrificed forward-looking strategy to crisis 
management – and it is hard to demonstrate progress when reform is cast as a response 
to a strategic crisis. The announcement of failure in effect prefigures the measurement 
of results. Replacing the Mbeki government’s programmes with a new strategy and at 
the same time embarking on a major reorganisation of the department, meant that 
COGTA was in a weak position to drive long-term reform in government. In late 2011, 
Sicelo Shiceka was replaced as Minister by the relatively junior and inexperienced 
Richard Baloyi. Subsequently, the Director-General, Elroy Africa, resigned. These 
developments have left a leadership vacuum in the local government sector after the 
2011 elections. Despite these shortcomings there are several important advances. The 
devolution of housing and public transport functions to larger cities reflects a greater 
appreciation of the importance of the built environment to growth and development. 
The announcement in COGTA’s 2011/12-budget vote that the financial model for local 
government will be reviewed was a welcome acknowledgement that receiving only 
eight percent of national revenue, local government has been underfunded all these 
years. However, by January 2012 there were still no practical details of the new model 
in the public domain. 
The outcome of the 2011 local elections illustrates the dichotomy that had 
opened between formal local democracy and the politics of the local in South Africa, 
between policy intent and local political reality. If the highest voter turnout yet, is 
cause to celebrate the deepening of local democracy in our country, the persistence 
of violent community protests and the rise of rates boycotts could be seen as a 
complementary, perhaps more effective, way in which citizens are asserting their 
voices and holding politicians accountable. In that case, what does it mean to say 
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that democracy is deepening, and by what measure? From the results we could also 
infer that the ANC retains its huge electoral support in the country, but also that 
(outside of the Western Cape) the electorate remains unwilling to punish the ruling 
party’s failures at the polls even when those failures have sparked violent protests. 
Are there two separate social contracts in South Africa – with citizen-government 
accountability transacted through the ruling party’s structures, as well as through 
formal institutions like elections? The introduction in 2011 of national legislation to 
prevent political office-holders from occupying senior management positions was a 
decisive intervention by national government to insulate municipal administration 
from undue political interference.11 But how will that measure fare when a post in a 
municipality is the gateway to a middle-class lifestyle in a city, town or rural area and 
when the informal rules of the profiteer trump formal processes and the law?      
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NOTES
1 South African policy-makers do not use the expression ‘policy reform’ in official documents. 
Nevertheless it is a useful analytical category, and in this chapter the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s (OECD, 2011) definition is used: policy reform is ‘a process 
in which changes are made to the formal “rules of the game” – including laws, regulations and 
institutions – to address a problem or achieve a goal.’ 
2 In the late 1980s there had been a series of low-intensity contacts between civics and town 
councils to end boycotts. For a discussion of these initiatives, see Heymans and Tötemeyer, 1988.
3 The Local Government Negotiating Forum was established on 22 March 1993. ‘The Forum was 
composed of 60 representatives half of them drawn from statutory bodies and the other half from 
non-statutory bodies (principally the South African National Civic Association which was aligned 
to the ANC’ (Steytler & De Visser, 2009:paras 1-10). For a detailed account of the local political 
negotiations see Cloete, 1994:294.  
4 The Local Government Transition Act No. 209 of 1993.
5 Act 75 of 1988, repealed by Act 62 of 1996. Municipal regulations on minimum competency 
requirements, Gazette No. 29967, 15 June 2007.
6 James Manor coined this phrase in an unpublished critique of the White Paper written in the late 
1990s.
7 For example, the DPLG report showed that by December 2001 36 percent had insufficient 
accommodation, 32 percent lacked basic office equipment (telephones, faxes, etc.), only 31 
percent had a delegation framework, 33 percent had completed financial delegations, and 46 
percent had an amalgamation plan.
8 The article is a summary of the main findings of Jain, H. 2010. Community protests in South Africa: 
Trends, analysis and explanation, available from: http://www.ldphs.org.za.
9 This data was supplied by National Taxpayers Union and is current as of November 2010. Data 
after that date was not available to the author at the time of writing and could not be obtained 
from the NTO website, which has not been operational for some time. Generally, the associations 
declare disputes in terms of section 102 of the Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000, which 
provides for the exemption of an individual ratepayer from the enforcement by the municipality 
of its debt collection and credit control policies where a dispute is declared on a specific amount. 
That section, however, does not create a general right to withhold payment. In Rademan v 
Moqhaka Municipality and others 2011 SCA Case No: 173/11 the Supreme Court of Appeal held 
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that a municipality has the right to disconnect without a court order the electricity supply to a 
rate-payer who is in default. 
10 Stanley Fish quoted in Bauerlein, 2011.
11 Local Government: Municipal Systems Amendment Act No. 7 of 2011.
